Epidemic impact: take March as a mirror and look at April. In March, the impact of the epidemic on the leading beer producers in the second round was as follows: Tsingtao beer (volume decreased by more than 20%) China Resources (volume decreased by more than one digit) heavy beer (sales volume was flat) ≈ Pearl River (there may be an increase), which was mainly due to the strong impact of epidemic related diseases in key markets (Tsingtao beer sales in Shandong accounted for 25%, China Resources and heavy beer epidemic related regions accounted for double digits in the middle), and the weak impact of high proportion of non current drinks (Pearl River circulation accounted for more than 70%). Looking forward to April, the dark hour in Shanghai has passed, and we look forward to the marginal improvement of epidemic prevention and control. March to April is still the off-season (the sales volume of a single month accounts for about 10% of the whole year). Preparations for the peak season begin in mid and late April. It is suggested to focus on when the inflection point of the epidemic appears.
Cost pressure: there is no need to worry too much. Controlling fees and raising prices again are reserved means. 1) Heavy beer: in the 21 year ton cost, brewing raw materials account for about 20%, packaging materials account for nearly 50%, and transportation costs account for 7-8%. At present, the price locking of barley and malt has been completed in 22 years, the procurement time of rice is more flexible, and the annual price locking of packaging materials has not been completed. After the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Shenzhen Agricultural Products Group Co.Ltd(000061) costs fluctuated sharply, and oil prices soared, putting pressure on single ton freight. We assume that the 22-year volume increases by double digits, and it is estimated that the 22-year ton cost growth rate of heavy beer is about 4%. 2) China Resources: in the ton cost, brewing raw materials account for 20-25% and packaging materials 40-45%. At present, the price lock of barley has been completed in 22 years, and the glass is diluted after returning to the bottle, but the carton and aluminum materials have increased greatly. The company estimates that the direct material cost in 22 years will increase by 1.5-1.6 billion compared with that in 21 years (assuming that the sales volume increases slightly by 1-2 points, the change of ton cost is expected to be about 6%). 3) Tsingtao Beer: at present, the price of barley is locked to Q3, the cumulative increase of aluminum is high, and the glass is slightly increased. We assume that the change range of ton cost is about 6%. We judge that the cost pressure of heavy beer may be weaker than that of its peers, which is mainly due to the low proportion of aluminum materials with large increase, the amortization of fixed costs by volume increase (Wusu continued to grow for 22 years, and the overall volume increased by double digits), and excellent supply chain management. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has exacerbated the cost fluctuation, but the second round of price increase (Sichuan feedback that the price of snow Chunsheng tins and superx bottles has been adjusted from March to April) and fee control (China Resources has reduced the 22-year sales rate to the same, and the increase in heavy beer budget is about 1PCT temporarily) are measures to alleviate the higher than expected cost rise.
Baijiu: the mood of the board has been stabilized and rebounded during the week. The proportion of foreign investors holding high-end liquor and Maotai five has also risen. Although the epidemic prevention and control measures still exist, but looking back at the situation of prevention and control is getting better. In April, the sector is still in a relatively low season. We expect that the proportion of Baijiu sales in 3~4 will be about 12%~13% in the whole year. If the epidemic prevention and control improves in April, we believe that the impact on the consumer side is controllable, mainly due to the rhythm disturbance between quarters. Maotai was officially launched and put into trial operation “I Maotai” within a week, which means that the company has further implemented market-oriented reform. At present, we are still the first to promote the deterministic high-end maowulu, and the PE in 22 years is 36x / 23x / 28x respectively. It is suggested to pay attention to the elastic secondary high-end and real estate wine.
Popular products: 1) beer: we think beer is the top sub sector in the main line of epidemic repair. If the epidemic prevention and control in peak season is proper, it is expected to realize the logic of volume increase under the background of low base last year. At the same time, the transmission of early price increases is smooth, there is no need to worry about the cost pressure, the profit elasticity can be released under fee control and secondary price increases, and the logic of medium and long-term high-end + improvement of business efficiency remains unchanged. 2) Dairy products: it is estimated that the revenue growth rate of Yili and Mengniu in Q1 is more than double digits. From the perspective of supply and demand, the raw milk price is likely to decline gradually in 22 years. However, the recent sharp rise in crops has led to the increase of cow feeding costs, which still disturbs the milk price in the short term. The follow-up trend remains to be observed. The trend of increasing net interest rate this year is still clear. 3) Food synthesis: the performance pressure of most food companies will be released in Q1. With the improvement of the epidemic situation and the decline of base pressure, it is expected to usher in marginal improvement. 4) Condiment: condiment, as a required consumer product, has outperformed CPI in price index in the past few years and has strong anti inflation ability. In the long run, with the continuous strengthening of dynamic zeroing, precise prevention and control and other policies, the difficulties of the epidemic will eventually be overcome. It is suggested to pay attention to the marginal improvement brought by the subsequent rebound of catering consumption and the decline of costs.
Risk warning: macroeconomic downside risk / continuous and repeated epidemic risk / regional market competition risk.
