“Seeing him rise from the Zhu building, seeing him feast guests, seeing his building collapse.” Recalling the boundless scenery and the withering and loss after the collapse of the building, people always sigh like this.
Shopping malls are changing. A large-scale enterprise can rise, occupy the leading position in the industry and be recognized by the value of 100 billion in the capital market. It may take countless people of insight to cultivate for several years or even decades. However, its overturning may only be “overnight”.
After reflection, the reasons for the “collapse” of these once 100 billion large-scale companies may be complex. Sometimes it may be a wrong decision in a critical period, sometimes it may be a wrong successor, sometimes it is the company management that can not keep up with the pace of the market, and sometimes it is the wrong idea of overall corporate governance from top to bottom.
In 2021, such a “story” is still repeating.
the bankruptcy and reorganization of “Xinji” Ziguang group fell into a “war of words”
The bankruptcy of Ziguang group was a little sudden. In July 2021, a bankruptcy reorganization statement of Ziguang group shocked China’s semiconductor industry.
Who doesn’t know purple light? This school run enterprise founded by Tsinghua University in 1988 is the largest integrated circuit enterprise in China and the third largest mobile phone chip enterprise in the world with 20% of the global SIM card chip market share. It ranks first in China and second in the world in the field of enterprise IT service segmentation. According to public information, Ziguang group has three A-share listed companies Unigroup Guoxin Microelectronics Co.Ltd(002049) (002049. SZ), Unisplendour Corporation Limited(000938) (000938. SZ), Xueda (Xiamen) Education Technology Group Co.Ltd(000526) (000526. SZ), with a market value of more than 300 billion yuan at its peak. The group also has a number of chip enterprises such as Changjiang storage and Ziguang zhanrui. In addition, Ziguang group also acquired Xinhua III, a subsidiary of HP, and has a layout in the direction of cloud computing and big data.
Behind the rapid rise, Ziguang group and its subordinate enterprises successively acquired more than 20 enterprises such as Spreadtrum communications, radico microelectronics and Xinhua III in six years from 2013 to 2019, with an investment of more than 100 billion yuan, which made Ziguang group quickly become China’s largest chip industry group from an unknown school-run enterprise in just a few years. The price is the high debt of Ziguang group. The data show that by the end of June 2020, the total liabilities of Ziguang group will reach 202.9 billion yuan, an increase of about 44 times over the end of 2012. In addition, according to the draft bankruptcy reorganization, taking June 30, 2021 as the evaluation base date, the audited and investigated liabilities of seven reorganization enterprises such as Ziguang group totaled 157.834 billion yuan.
With the default of the first bond of “17 Ziguang group ppn005” on November 16, 2020, Ziguang group fell into the abyss of “insolvency”. Zhao Weiguo, chairman and CEO of Ziguang group, said frankly a few days ago, “because we are eager to do things as soon as possible, we do it in the way of debt. This is also a strategic mistake I made in terms of strategic responsibility. (the rhythm of expansion) is really not well grasped.”
On December 10, 2021, the restructuring results of Ziguang group were released, and it was determined that the consortium composed of Beijing Zhilu Asset Management Co., Ltd. and Beijing Jianguang Asset Management Co., Ltd. as the lead party was the strategic investor of Ziguang group. However, this plan was strongly opposed by Beijing Jiankun Investment Group Co., Ltd., the second shareholder of Ziguang group, and its controller Zhao Weiguo. He questioned the loss of state-owned assets in the reorganization and said that it had been reported to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and other departments in real name. At present, this “war of words” is still going on.
“Shennong” takes over and “saves” Kangmei
On December 24, 2021, Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co.Ltd(600518) (600518. Sh, i.e. “Kangmei pharmaceutical”) disclosed that according to the reorganization plan, Guangdong Shennong enterprise management partnership (hereinafter referred to as “Shennong”) planned to invest in the listed company with an investment capital of no more than 5.419 billion yuan, and obtained 3.509 billion converted shares. If the above arrangements are implemented, Shennong will hold Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co.Ltd(600518) with a shareholding ratio of 25.31%. However, the listed company still has no actual controller.
At the same time, according to the announcement of CSI small and medium-sized Investor Service Center on December 22, 52037 investors of Kangmei pharmaceutical will be paid about 2.459 billion yuan in cash, debt to equity swap, trust usufruct and other ways. So far, as the protagonist of the largest financial fraud case in the history of a shares, Kangmei pharmaceutical’s mess has been gradually solved under the supervision of the regulatory authorities.
Due to the financial fraud “involving huge amount, long duration, particularly serious nature and bad social impact”, Kangmei pharmaceutical and its founder and actual controller Ma Xingtian will undoubtedly be recorded in the history of a shares.
As the once “big white horse” with a market value of 100 billion yuan, Kangmei pharmaceutical was founded by Ma Xingtian and his wife in 1997. At the beginning of its listing in 2001, the market value of the company was less than 900 million yuan, but by 2015, its market value exceeded 100 billion yuan, becoming the first 100 billion listed pharmaceutical enterprise in the A-share market. On May 29, 2018, the market value of the listed company broke another record and reached 139 billion yuan. However, amid more and more doubts about financial fraud in the market, the CSRC launched a case filing investigation in December 2018. On April 29, 2019, Kangmei pharmaceutical suddenly “exposed” accounting errors in financial data, and the monetary funds were included in RMB 29.9 billion; On May 17 of the same year, the CSRC verified the major financial fraud of the listed company from 2016 to 2018.
Overnight, the “big white horse” fell, and the share price of Kangmei pharmaceutical once fell to a low value of 1.56 yuan / share in early 2021. In May 2020, the CSRC gave the company a warning and imposed a fine of 600000 yuan, fined Ma Xingtian and other main responsible persons, and took lifelong measures to prohibit entry into the securities market. On November 17, 2021, Ma Xingtian was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and 1.2 million yuan by the court for the crime of manipulating the securities market, illegal disclosure, non disclosure of important information and unit bribery.
What is more groundbreaking and exemplary is that on November 12 this year, the Guangzhou intermediate people’s court made a judgment of first instance on the lawsuit of the special representative of Kangmei pharmaceutical securities. The total amount of investor losses borne by the relevant defendants amounted to 2.459 billion yuan, and sentenced Ma Xingtian and other six people to bear joint and several liability for repayment; Among them, five independent directors at that time bear 5% ~ 10% joint and several liability. This directly triggered a heated discussion on the independent director system in the market, and the relevant impact is still continuing.
how to “restart” Zhongtai automobile with a debt of 14.8 billion?
On December 20, 2021, Zotye Automobile Co.Ltd(000980) (000980. SZ, i.e. “Zhongtai automobile”) announced that after the implementation of the restructuring plan, its controlling shareholder was changed from Tieniu group to Jiangsu Shenshang. It is reported that the legal representative of Jiangsu Shenshang is Huang Jihong, who has participated in the reorganization of another A-share listed company Pang Da Automobile Trade Co.Ltd(601258) (601258. SH).
For investors, Zhongtai’s “rebirth” plan is becoming clearer and clearer. According to the interface news, according to the restructuring plan, the restructuring investors will implement market-oriented reform of Zhongtai automobile to realize rapid recovery of performance; Among them, it is planned to lay out the medium and high-end new energy vehicle market by means of acquisition and joint venture, and will lay out the online car Hailing market and the rural business of micro electric vehicles.
However, the current situation of Zhongtai automobile is not optimistic. The company once said frankly that it was faced with various complex situations, such as lack of working capital, overall overdue interest bearing liabilities, overall suspension of production and operation, entanglement of litigation cases, seizure of assets and so on. Among them, the company is seriously insolvent. As of September 30, 2021, the total liabilities are RMB 14.892 billion, including current liabilities of RMB 14.405 billion and short-term loans of RMB 4.872 billion, and the monetary capital on the account is only RMB 797 million; Meanwhile, as of October 25 this year, the creditors of Zhongtai automobile reported 46 claims to the manager, totaling RMB 8.182 billion, and the manager preliminarily reviewed and determined 32 claims, totaling RMB 5.357 billion.
In retrospect, Zhongtai automobile was also in the limelight. In 2016, it also achieved an annual sales of more than 330000 vehicles, ranking among the top 10 in the sales list of independent brands. In 2017, Jinma Co., Ltd. (the predecessor of Zhongtai automobile) purchased 100% equity of Yongkang Zhongtai by issuing shares to Tieniu group. Since then, Jinma Co., Ltd. has become Zhongtai automobile, and the controlling shareholder is Tieniu group. On December 18, 2020, Tieniu group was declared bankrupt by the court because of “serious insolvency, no ability to continue operation and lack of possibility of rescue”.
However, after landing in the A-share market, the sales volume of Zhongtai automobile did not rise but fell. By 2018, the sales volume fell to 230000 vehicles, failing to achieve half of its annual target of 480000 vehicles in that year; In 2019, the sales volume will drop to 153000. The performance of the listed company then turned bad. From 2017 to 2020, the company’s net profit attributable to the parent company was 1.136 billion yuan, 800 million yuan, – 11.19 billion yuan and – 10.801 billion yuan respectively, and continued to lose 990 million yuan in the first September of 2021. Over the past three years, the company has accumulated a loss of nearly 23 billion yuan. Zhongtai automobile said frankly that affected by the shortage of funds, the whole vehicle business of the company is basically in a state of shutdown and basically has no sales revenue.
Guangzhou Longqi “laundry detergent running”
Zoneco Group Co.Ltd(002069) (002069. SZ) scallops love to “run away”, and Lonkey Industrial Co.Ltd.Guangzhou(000523) (000523. SZ, i.e. “Guangzhou Longqi”) staged the missing record of laundry detergent.
Speaking of it, Guangzhou Longqi is not a “nobody”. Founded in 1959, as a designated manufacturer of early daily chemical products in South China, the company was officially listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as early as 1993 and was once known as “the first share of daily chemical products in China”.
On September 27, 2020, Guangzhou Longqi suddenly “exposed itself” and the inventory disappeared. It is said that the company once stored goods with a total value of 572 million yuan in the reservoir areas of Jiangsu Hongshen logistics and Jiangsu Huifeng petrochemical; However, both companies denied keeping the relevant goods; Jiangsu Huifeng Petrochemical also said that the document seal produced by Guangzhou Longqi was inconsistent with its company seal.
Problems arise almost simultaneously. On September 24 last year, without warning, the company disclosed that overdue debts totaled 395 million yuan and 12 bank accounts were frozen. By August 30, 2021, the overdue debt will increase to 921 million yuan. According to the 2020 annual report, the total provision for asset impairment and credit impairment for the above bulk trade business and other accounts receivable is RMB 6.958 billion. As a result, the company’s profit in 2020 fell by 7405.78% to a loss of 4.484 billion yuan, and the audited net assets were -2.585 billion yuan; The delisting risk warning was implemented and superimposed with other risk warnings on May 6, 2021.
During this period, the CSRC launched a case filing investigation on Lonkey Industrial Co.Ltd.Guangzhou(000523) on January 8, 2021. At the end of January, Chen Jianbin, former vice chairman and general manager of Guangzhou Longqi, and Wang Zhigang, former Secretary of the board of directors, were placed on file for investigation by the supervisory authority on suspicion of job violation; In February, several employees of the listed company were investigated by the public security on suspicion of misappropriating funds. In addition, according to the news of Guangzhou Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and supervision in November 2020, Fu Yongguo, former chairman of Guangzhou Longqi, was arrested in July 2021 on suspicion of serious violation of discipline and law.
On December 24, 2021, the administrative punishment decision officially issued by the CSRC showed that Guangzhou Longqi made financial fraud in 2018 and 2019, in which the total operating revenue was falsely increased by means of fictitious commodity trade business and circular trading, totaling RMB 12.885 billion; At the same time, in order to beautify the statements, the company adjusted some falsely increased prepayments to falsely increased inventories. According to the regulatory investigation, Fu Yongguo organized, planned and implemented financial fraud related to Guangzhou Longqi, and took 10-year measures to prohibit him from entering the securities market.
With the conclusion of the investigation, the reorganization plan of Guangzhou Longqi since September 29 this year was completed on December 23, and the bankruptcy reorganization procedure was terminated. After the reorganization, whether it can return to the former grand occasion may be what Guangzhou Longqi investors look forward to most.
Haixin iron and steel “successor” with a reward of 21.62 million
Li Zhaohui will return to the public view from an enforcement reward notice issued by the court. On September 15, 2021, Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s court announced that the Shanxi Meijin Energy Co.Ltd(000723) (000723. SZ) controlling shareholder Shanxi Meijin Energy Co.Ltd(000723) group offered a “reward” of 21.62 million yuan to “arrest” Li Zhaohui, the former richest man in Shanxi.
Nowadays, people often regard Li Zhaohui as another failure case of “rich second generation” taking over the family business. However, the original Li Zhaohui also had unlimited scenery.
In 2003, his father Li Haicang was shot and killed. With the support of his grandfather Li Chunyuan, Li Zhaohui, 22, was forced to stop his studies in Australia and return home to inherit his family business – Haixin iron and steel, China’s largest private iron and steel enterprise at that time. The young Li Zhaohui once said shyly, “the enterprise belongs to my father and can’t be defeated by me.”
Although Li Zhaohui had no experience in enterprise management, did not know much, and even later said frankly that he “did not like” the steel industry, Haixin steel, which he inherited, still made brilliant achievements in the next two years. In 2003, Haixin iron and steel ushered in the peak by riding the east wind of the high prosperity of the industry. In that year, the total output value exceeded 5 billion yuan, the profits and taxes paid exceeded 1 billion yuan, and contributed 300 million yuan to the local finance; In 2004, the total output value of the group increased to 7 billion yuan, realizing profits and taxes of 1.2 billion yuan, becoming the largest taxpayer of China’s private enterprises in that year.
However, compared with Haixin iron and steel, Li Zhaohui is more interested in another piece of investment left by his father. In 2004, Li Zhaohui acquired 161 million China Minsheng Banking Corp.Ltd(600016) corporate shares in the hands of China Nonferrous Metal Industry’S Foreign Engineering And Construction Co.Ltd(000758) (000758. SZ) with 594 million yuan, becoming the tenth largest shareholder of China Minsheng Banking Corp.Ltd(600016) . According to previous statistics of interface news, Li Zhaohui once benefited about 2.659 billion yuan from this “cash out”. Having tasted the sweetness, Li Zhaohui later acquired the equity of A-share listed companies such as Aluminum Corporation Of China Limited(601600) (601600. Sh, 02600. HK), Industrial Bank Co.Ltd(601166) (601166. SH), Shanghai Yimin Commercial Group Co.Ltd(600824) (600824. SH). By 2008, Li Zhaohui’s personal assets reached 12.5 billion yuan and was promoted to “the richest man in Shanxi”. In 2010, he married actress Che Xiao, which is the most brilliant memory of Haixin iron and steel and Li Zhaohui.
Li Wenjie, general manager of Haixin iron and steel, once publicly said that in 2007, the company’s income in the capital market reached 2 billion yuan. Even in the tragic market in 2008, the income exceeded 1 billion yuan, exceeding the net income of the main iron and steel industry. However, the actual situation is that after the poor management of the main iron and steel industry, Haixin iron and steel and Li Zhaohui fell into a “dark moment”. Since the end of 2011, Li Zhaohui has cashed out about 1.5 billion yuan through three holdings reduction and selling in the capital market. From 2013 to 2015, the iron and steel industry entered the “cold winter”, the national steel enterprises suffered losses, Haixin iron and steel fell into a liquidity crisis and was insolvent; In March 2014, Haixin iron and steel, with a valuation of more than 10 billion yuan and a debt of 23.4 billion yuan, stopped production, and Li Zhaohui applied to the court for bankruptcy reorganization.
In December 2017, the Shanghai Higher People’s court included Li Zhaohui in the list of dishonest persons and restricted him from leaving the country. In 2018, Shanxi Taiyuan intermediate people’s Court issued a notice urging the person subjected to execution to fulfill his legal obligations, which showed that Li Zhaohui would become a “Lao Lai”.
“Chinese version Zara” La Chapelle’s dream is broken
For the post-80s and post-90s, La Chapel (603157. Sh, 06116. HK, i.e. ” Xinjiang La Chapelle Fashion Co.Ltd(603157) “) is no stranger.
In May 1998, Xing Jiaxing from Fujian founded La chapel. Xing Jiaxing himself is a fan of Zara’s fast fashion model. He is determined to build La chapel into a “Chinese version of Zara”. In 2012, La chapel defined the development strategy of “multi brand + direct marketing”. In the following five years, the number of offline stores of the company increased from 1841 in 2011 to 9448 by the end of 2017. At the same time, the number of brands of the company increased from three women’s clothing brands before 2011 to nine sub brands thereafter, and invested in other brands, covering different segments such as women’s clothing, men’s clothing and children’s clothing.
This strategy enables La chapel to reach its peak in 2018. This year, the company’s revenue exceeded 10 billion, with stores in 30 provinces across the country and covering about 2000 shopping malls and shopping centers. At that time, La chapel, as Xing Jiaxing wished, became the “Chinese version Zara” in the industry. During this period, La chapel also ushered in a high light moment in the capital market. It landed in Hong Kong stock market and A-share market in 2014 and 2017 respectively, becoming China’s first “a + H” listed garment company.
However, La Chabel is “at its peak” in the A-share market. Less than a month after listing, the value of the company’s a stock market rose to a high of 16.3 billion yuan in mid October 2017, and there has been no breakthrough since then. Meanwhile, in 2018, while the revenue exceeded the 10 billion mark, La chapel lost 160 million yuan. Thereafter, it continued to lose 2.166 billion yuan, 1.84 billion yuan and 289 million yuan in 2019, 2020 and September 2021. On July 1, 2020, due to losses for two consecutive years, the company was warned of delisting risk, reduced to ” Xinjiang La Chapelle Fashion Co.Ltd(603157) “, and has failed to “turn over” so far. By the end of December 2021, the company’s a stock market value is only more than 1 billion.
According to the interface news, by the end of September 2021, the number of offline stores of La chapel has rapidly shrunk to 349, and has been sold and stripped of its sub brands one after another. In 2020, the “desperate” La chapel adjusted its online business to the “brand authorization + operation service” mode, which is what the industry calls “selling hanging tags”. However, this failed to reverse the decline. By the end of September this year, the company had liabilities of 3.861 billion yuan, including short-term loans of 1.161 billion yuan, and the monetary capital on the account was only 175 million yuan. By the end of October, La chapel had involved 58 litigation cases involving 530 million yuan, frozen 144 bank accounts involving 126 million yuan.
On November 22, 2021, three creditors applied to the court for bankruptcy liquidation of the company; The applicant believes that La chapel cannot pay off its due debts, and its assets are insufficient to pay off all debts or obviously lack solvency.
“100 billion” Wanfang group can’t get 800000
On November 23, 2021, Baoxiniao Holding Co.Ltd(002154) (002154. SZ) applied for bankruptcy reorganization of Wanfang group, the parent company of Vanfund Urban Investment&Development Co.Ltd(000638) (000638. SZ, i.e. “Wanfang development”), because the payment for 800000 tooling could not be completed. There are early signs that the building will collapse. Tianyan check shows that since 2018, Wanfang group and its controller Zhang Hui have been applied for “dishonest Executees” and restricted high consumption due to overdue arrears.
Wanfang group was once famous in the business world for its real estate business layout and once claimed to have “100 billion” assets. Public information shows that as a diversified large enterprise group with project investment, capital operation and equity management as the main operation mode, Wanfang group, established in 2000, has a business scope covering urban construction, trade, mining, real estate, science and technology, medical treatment and other fields.
In October 2008, Wanfang group achieved A-share listing in its real estate asset sector through “backdoor” Zhongliao International ( Vanfund Urban Investment&Development Co.Ltd(000638) former name), a company listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with a market value of more than 10 billion during the peak period. However, for a long time, Wanfang group’s performance has been fluctuating and declining since 2011. During this period, Wanfang group fell into losses four times in 2013, 2015, 2018 and 2020, with a loss of up to 147 million yuan in 2018. On June 11, 2021, due to the loss of RMB 17.0552 million in 2020 and the operating income of less than RMB 100 million, the company changed from “Wanfang development” to ” Vanfund Urban Investment&Development Co.Ltd(000638) “, and the delisting risk warning of the company’s shares was implemented.
One episode is that in September 2018, Wanfang group tried to restructure its Chenzhou fanlongdui Mining Co., Ltd. with another A-share listed company Danhua Chemical Technology Co.Ltd(600844) (600844. SH), involving a capital of 1.1 billion yuan, but failed in March 2019.
“Henan Paper king” Silver Pigeon investment has been delisted
Silver Pigeon investment, formerly known as Luohe No. 1 paper mill founded in 1967, is one of the largest paper enterprises in Henan Province. Its “Silver Pigeon paper” was once the special paper for Mao Zedong’s anthology and primary and secondary school textbooks. It was once known as the “king of Henan paper making” in the industry. In April 1997, the company landed on the A-share market and became the “first share of Chinese straw pulp”.
Meng Fei, the actual controller, was once regarded as a “life-saving straw” by the poorly managed Silver Pigeon investment. In May 2016, the controlling shareholder of the company Yinge Group Henan energy and Chemical Group Co., Ltd. transferred all the shares invested by Yinge, which was auctioned with a capital contribution of RMB 3.158 billion by Shenzhen AoYing Investment Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Shenzhen Aoying”). Meng Fei indirectly controlled the listed company through Shenzhen Aoying held by his mother Meng Ping. At that time, the share price of silver pigeon investment rushed to a high of 12.91 yuan / share, the highest since the listing of a shares.
But Meng Fei failed to save Silver Pigeon investment. In 2016, the company lost 399 million yuan; In 2017, it reversed its losses to a profit of 56 million yuan; However, in 2018 and 2019, silver pigeon investment continued to lose 89 million yuan and 638 million yuan; Before delisting, the company lost 174 million yuan by the end of September 2020. On April 3, 2020, silver pigeon investment implemented delisting risk warning and became “* St Silver Pigeon” due to losses for two consecutive years and audit opinions that could not express opinions were issued.
During this period, the risk of silver pigeon investment has long been exposed by creditors. In September 2019, Shenzhen Qianhai Fitch Tiancheng financial leasing held a press conference and reported publicly. Since July 2018, silver pigeon investment as a guarantor has at least 2.4 billion yuan of illegal guarantee, and the borrower is silver pigeon group and its affiliates; Silver Pigeon investment did not disclose these guarantees. In April 2020, “Zhongzhi” Beijing Tongguan Capital Management Co., Ltd. sued Silver Pigeon investment and asked it to repay 400.8 million yuan. On July 3, 2020, Putian international, Meng Fei’s “old boss”, sued Silver Pigeon investment for being in arrears with the purchase and sales payment of 989 million yuan.
Under various crises, on May 17, 2020, the CSRC launched a case filing investigation on Silver Pigeon investment. Without waiting for the survey results, investors “sold” the company’s shares. During the 20 trading days from May 13 to June 9, the share price of silver pigeon investment was continuously lower than 1 yuan / share, and finally touched the delisting red line of par value. On August 27, 2020, silver pigeon investment was delisted by Shanghai Stock Exchange.
On March 23, 2021, the court officially accepted the bankruptcy reorganization of silver pigeon investment; Silver Pigeon investment enters bankruptcy proceedings. On April 15, silver pigeon investment suddenly disclosed that Meng Fei, chairman and general manager of the company, was detained by Tianjin Jizhou District Supervision Committee on suspicion of job-related crimes. This brings some uncertainty to the bankruptcy reorganization of silver pigeon investment.
“ticket agent giant” tengbang international fell
As the only private company listed in China with air ticket agency business, tengbang International (300178. SZ, i.e. ” Tempus Global Business Service Group Holding Ltd(300178) “) once ranked 38th among China’s top 500 private enterprises.
After the listing of A-Shares in February 2011, tengbang international made great strides in expansion. On the one hand, it arranged business travel management, hotel reservation, air ticket agency and other businesses through mergers and acquisitions of Suzhou Octopus tourism and Xiyou CITS; On the other hand, since 2012, tengbang international has successively arranged financial sectors such as Rongyi microfinance, third-party payment tengfutong, insurance brokerage and investment. During this period, the market value of tengbang international exceeded 10 billion in 2015; Meanwhile, from 2011 to 2017, the company’s revenue increased from 181 million yuan to 3.53 billion yuan, and the net profit attributable to the parent increased from 58 million yuan to 284 million yuan.
However, under the general trend of “financial deleveraging” in 2018, tengbang international soon fell into a liquidity crisis, and its debt soared from 104 million yuan in 2011 to 6.046 billion yuan in 2018. After 2019, the company’s private fund delayed cashing, serial debt default and other crises broke out, and even was disqualified from air ticket agency business. Since the outbreak in 2020, the company’s crisis has intensified.
In 2018, tengbang International’s revenue soared to RMB 4.886 billion, but its net profit attributable to its parent company after deduction of non profits fell sharply by 85.08% to RMB 31 million. In 2019, 2020 and September before 2021, the company lost 1.576 billion yuan, 1.049 billion yuan and 348 million yuan, and nearly 3 billion yuan in less than three years. On May 6, 2021, tengbang international was warned of delisting risk and became ” Tempus Global Business Service Group Holding Ltd(300178) “.
Down here. Qiao Hai, a former director of tengbang international, once said frankly that since its listing, tengbang international has invested more than one billion overseas, which are long-term equity investments without any short-term income, which has seriously squeezed the liquidity of the company, and Zhong Baisheng has unshirkable responsibility.
Today, tengbang international is on the verge of bankruptcy and delisting. In October 2020, tengbang group, the controlling shareholder of the company, was applied for bankruptcy reorganization. In April 2021, tengbang international also applied for reorganization on the grounds that it could not pay off its due debts but had reorganization value and the possibility of reorganization. However, on November 30, tengbang international was investigated by the CSRC on suspicion of illegal information disclosure. On December 15, the company announced that the bankruptcy reorganization of the listed company and its controlling shareholder tengbang group had not been accepted by the court.
On December 22, as the main revenue source of tengbang international, tengfutong’s application for renewal of payment business license was suspended by the central bank. This may be the real “darkest moment” of tengbang international.
Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) “playing” financial technology can not escape the bankruptcy crisis
The market value of Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) (002366. SZ), which claims to be the “leader of nuclear power”, once hit about 24 billion yuan. However, the peak time is as gorgeous and short as fireworks.
According to the interface news, Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) was listed on the A-share market by “backdoor” Danfu shares, which was originally engaged in the R & D of refrigeration compressors. On October 29, 2015, Danfu shares was officially renamed ” Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) “. At that time, the relevant parties signed the “performance bet agreement”, which showed that they promised Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) that the audited net profit deducted from non attributable parent company (hereinafter referred to as “net profit”) in 2015, 2016 and 2017 would not be less than 304 million yuan, 508 million yuan and 577 million yuan respectively, and the cumulative amount would not be less than 1.389 billion yuan.
Two years before listing, the nuclear power industry was pressed the pause button, and the approval projects stalled. Affected by this, in 2015 and 2016, Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) realized a net profit of 20.8168 million yuan and 351 million yuan. It was not until 2017 that the company’s net profit soared to RMB 1.022 billion that its cumulative net profit from 2015 to 2017 reached RMB 1.394 billion, just exceeding the gambling performance line of RMB 1.389 billion. In 2017, Taihai Manoir Nuclear Equipment Co.Ltd(002366) actual controller and Chairman Wang Xu
