Research conclusion
Climate issues have long been inseparable from the dispute over development rights and development models (especially between developing and developed countries). This is reflected in the multilateral climate negotiation mechanism such as the UN climate summit. In 2021, Europe and the United States also tried to combine climate policy and trade policy to build an international trade standard with carbon as the core, so as to ensure their voice in the climate field and corresponding industrial competitiveness. How will Europe and the United States establish a "climate club" in the future? What degree can China achieve in terms of climate during the 14th Five Year Plan period? How will climate politics spill over to the economic field? This paper mainly discusses these problems.
The measurement of carbon emission cost is the main technical difficulty for Europe and the United States to reach climate cooperation. The two sides are seeking an acceptable solution to this problem. Due to the differences in development level and emission reduction technology between developed countries and developing countries, developed countries can enhance their manufacturing advantages by expanding climate issues to the field of trade. However, a considerable number of countries, including the United States, do not have a mature national carbon market, which leads to frequent obstacles in the promotion of the carbon border regulation mechanism with carbon cost as the core. However, judging from the statement made by Kerry, the special envoy of the president of the United States on climate issues, and the content of the EU CBAM amendment, Europe and the United States are seeking a "consensus" on this issue.
In terms of carbon emission, the current gap between China and some overseas developed countries mainly lies in energy consumption intensity and carbon emission intensity. Compared with Germany and the United States, China has the following characteristics: (1) the total carbon emission is high, but the per capita carbon dioxide emission is not high. In 2019, China's per capita carbon dioxide emission was only 96% of that of Germany and 52.1% of that of the United States; (2) The proportion of clean energy is relatively high and the investment is large. At present, the proportion of non fossil energy in total energy consumption and clean energy in power generation in China are greater than that in the United States but less than that in Germany; (3) The gap between energy consumption intensity and industrial carbon emission intensity is larger than the energy structure, which may be related to the gap between energy conservation and emission reduction technologies and industrial structure.
At present, the consensus on climate issues between China, the United States and China and Europe is greater than differences. However, at present, there are still many "hidden reefs" in international climate cooperation. Considering that there are still differences between Europe and the United States on some key issues, the swing of US climate policy, and whether China and Europe can formulate more favorable carbon price rules through consultation, it is difficult for us to accurately predict the future carbon centered trade rule framework, However, we believe that the current climate politics is likely to spill over to the economic field through the following ways: (1) as we discussed in "from Europe to China: opening the era of global energy security", CBAM (European carbon border regulation mechanism) has little short-term impact, but has put forward higher requirements for China's emission reduction technology and industrial upgrading in the long term. China's advantage lies in large-scale renewable energy investment. To truly realize the "immunity" to the "carbon price" mechanism and maintain the competitiveness of China's manufacturing industry, it means that in the 14th five year plan and even the subsequent period, it is necessary to increase investment in technological transformation and catch up with the gap in emission reduction; (2) Developing countries need to stabilize the supply of fossil energy such as coal in the short term to stabilize growth and protect people's livelihood, while Europe and the United States have a tougher attitude towards fossil energy. This difference superimposes the tendency of "de Sinicization" of some developed countries, In the future, we need to be wary of the "climate club" formed by Europe and the United States setting up obstacles to China's manufacturing exports in the name of climate change (such as accusing China's manufacturing industry of using energy with high carbon emissions to obtain unfair advantages); (3) China may not get the corresponding treatment from developing countries, and there is a risk that it will not only not get financial and technical support, but also bear the obligation of capital contribution; (4) High carbon emission projects invested abroad may face controversy. Most of China's one belt, one road, still has high demand for high carbon emissions and energy (including cement, fertilizer, steel, aluminum and other CBAM covered commodities and larger nuclear power), and China's related technology is more advanced. In the short term, the proportion of these projects investment is limited. Looking forward to the follow-up, on the one hand, developed countries may hinder overseas investment on the grounds of climate, and the specific impact can be learned from the obstruction of "beixi-2" by the United States on the grounds of geopolitics to a certain extent (the bill signed during Trump's administration imposes sanctions on enterprises participating in the "beixi-2" project). On the other hand, these investments may trigger disputes in emission reduction in the international community, Affect China's voice in the negotiation of international carbon price rules.
Risk tips: (1) the epidemic prevention policy of the United States is gradually easing, and there is a risk that the global industrial chain will be repaired and the United States will accelerate the process of "de Sinicization" in the name of climate. At the same time, after the outbreak of the epidemic and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, countries are paying more attention to the autonomy and controllability of local supply chains, and there is a risk of further deterioration of the trade environment in the future; (2) The ruling characteristics of the two parties in the United States have led to the swing of its climate policy, which has dragged down the construction process of the "climate club" in Europe and the United States.
